



DOES RETRANSMISSION CONSENT 
NEED FIXING? (OR DO CONSUMERS 
NEED HELP SO THEY CAN WATCH 
THE SUPER BOWL, WORLD SERIES, 
AND ACADEMY AWARDS?) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s marketplace, television programming consumers have more 
choices of providers than ever before. Customers are regularly bombarded with 
advertising from satellite, cable companies, and over-builders; and many can 
also choose a competitive wireline cable provider, such as Verizon or AT&T. 
In addition, more and more video programming is available online, with some 
customers choosing to drop all video subscription services in favor of Internet 
offerings.1 However, based on market share data, consumers still prefer tradi-
tional television.2 
Local broadcast affiliates of the major networks and network-owned affili-
ates had allowed cable providers to retransmit their feeds in exchange for car-
riage of other network-owned channels and similar non-monetary compensa-
tion.3 However, beginning around 2004, networks and broadcasters have used 
                                                 
† Gregory J. Vogt is the owner of the law firm of Law Offices of Gregory J. Vogt, PLLC, 
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 1 Jenna Wortham, Crowded Field for Bringing Web Video to TVs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
23, 2010, at B4. 
 2 NIELSEN, A LOOK ACROSS MEDIA: THE CROSS-PLATFORM REPORT Q3 2013, at 5 
(2013), available at http://commcns.org/1olhwIv; see Wortham, supra note 1; see also Mark 
Hughes, How Cable’s Emmy Wins Signal the Future of Television Programming, FORBES 
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://commcns.org/1i891CU (commenting on the success of television 
programs at the Emmy Awards). 
 3 Matthew A. Brill & Matthew T. Murchison, How the FCC Can Protect Consumers in 
the Battle Over Retransmissions Consent, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://commcns.org/OUraax 
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the entry of new competitors into the video programming market and their lev-
erage as providers of critical programming to demand increasing monetary 
compensation from cable and satellite providers.4 Battles over the appropriate 
level of compensation for network programming have led to several “black-
outs,” in which the broadcaster withholds permission for retransmission of its 
signal during negotiations.5 For example, Time Warner Cable’s viewers in a 
number of markets could not view CBS programming for at least a month in 
2013, and Cablevision’s New York viewers were unable to see the first two 
games of the 2010 World Series due to a transmission dispute between Ca-
blevision and Fox.6 These blackouts have raised the ire of consumers, causing 
concern both in Congress and at the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC” or “Commission”).7 
While broadcasters argue that the majority of retransmission consent agree-
ments are resolved without blackouts and that the retransmission consent re-
gime is working,8 multi-channel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), 
such as incumbent and competitive cable companies and satellite providers, 
claim that it is these increasing retransmission consent fees that are causing 
                                                                                                                 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
 4 See In re Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 2718, 2719 (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Time 
Warner et al., Petition] (“Today . . . many consumers have additional options for receiving 
programming . . . One result of such changes in the marketplace is that disputes over re-
transmission consent have become more contentious and more public, and we recently have 
seen a rise in negotiation impasses that have affected millions of consumers.”); see also 
Philip M. Napoli, Retransmission Consent and Broadcaster Commitment to Localism, 20 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 345, 345 (2012). 
 5 See Napoli, supra note 4, at 349 (“Of particular importance has been the increased 
frequency of actual or threatened broadcast station blackouts and the publicity surrounding 
these high-stakes negotiations. While there were 31 actual or publicly threatened broadcast 
blackout events between 2000 and 2009, there were 5 additional blackout events in 2010 
alone, affecting 19 million viewers.”). 
 6 Bill Carter, CBS Returns, Triumphant, to Cable Box, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013, at A1 
(discussing the month long dispute between Time Warner and CBS); see Time Warner et 
al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726–27; see also Brian Stelter, For World Series, Cablevision 
Steers Customers Online, N.Y. TIMES, http://commcns.org/1i898hL (last updated Oct. 27, 
2010, 8:02 PM) (“The first game of the [2010] World Series was blacked out in three mil-
lion homes serviced by Cablevision on Wednesday night, because of a continuing dispute 
between the cable company and Fox, which is broadcasting the championship series.”). 
 7 See Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726–27; see also Ted Johnson, 
CBS-Time Warner Cable Blackout Spurs D.C. Action on Retrans, VARIETY (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1hH85SR. 
 8 In re Amendment of Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission, Comments of 
National Association of Broadcasters, MB Docket No. 10-71, at 3, 7–8 (May 27, 2011), 
available at http://commcns.org/NoQDrC. The National Association of Broadcasters claims 
that “it is extremely rare for retransmission consent negotiations to result in disruptions to 
consumers’ viewing as a result of an impasse between a broadcaster and a MVPD.” Id. at 7. 
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consumers to suffer loses of programming and increased costs.9 Further com-
plicating matters is increased network demands that local affiliates rebate a 
portion of retransmission fees back to the network, and efforts by at least one 
network to offer the network feed to an MVPD directly if the MVPD is unable 
to come to agreement with the local affiliate.10 
A number of the major MVPDs have succeeded in convincing the FCC to 
initiate a rulemaking to revise the retransmission consent process, although the 
FCC’s authority in this area is limited by statute.11 Based on the conditions the 
Commission included in its approval of the Comcast/NBC merger, it is possi-
ble that the Commission might pressure broadcasters by allowing MVPDs to 
continue offering the broadcast programming during a negotiation impasse and 
by requiring binding arbitration.12 However, the FCC has concluded that it does 
not have the statutory authority to require these measures and instead sought 
comment on less stringent means to encourage retransmission agreements and 
avoid programming blackouts.13 
Currently, the competition amongst programmers for viewership is increas-
ing, the nature and delivery methods for programming are changing, and many 
programmers are making inroads against more traditional network TV shows.14 
Cable-delivered news programming has proliferated, although it provides a 
level of news coverage different from local news programming or over-the-air 
broadcasters.15 Notwithstanding these changes, however, many viewers still 
want access to local broadcasts for news and network programming,16 and 
                                                 
 9 In re Amendment of Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission, Comments of 
AT&T, MB Docket No. 10-71, at 9–10 (May 27, 2011), available at 
http://commcns.org/MJAWua. 
 10 See supra notes 59–62. 
 11 See Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2720–21, 2725. The Commission 
noted that in “March 2010, 14 MVPDs and public interest groups filed a rulemaking petition 
arguing that the Commission’s retransmission consent regulations are outdated and are 
harming consumers.” Id. at 2725. 
 12 In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC 
Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 4238, 4309, 4353, 4358, 4363–64 (Jan. 20, 2011) 
[hereinafter Comcast et al., Applications] (approving Comcast’s purchase of NBC-
Universal). Under Part II of Appendix A, the FCC required that retransmission consent be 
subject to commercial arbitration. Id. at 4358. At Part IV.G of Appendix A, the FCC lists 
the prohibited unfair practices. Id. at 4363–64. 
 13 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2720 & n.6. 
 14 See Hughes, supra note 2. 
 15 Hyuhn-Suhck Bae, Product Differentiation in National TV Newscasts: A Comparison 
of the Cable All-News Networks and the Broadcast Networks, 44 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 
62, 65 (2000) (observing that, for example, “CNN’s reporting was of less depth compared to 
network reporting,” and CNN reported on “a somewhat greater number of international 
stories”). 
 16 See Napoli, supra note 4, at 350–51 (noting that local broadcasting is important to 
citizens during natural disasters and that localism drives the communications policy in the 
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many new MVPDs believe carriage of local broadcasters is an essential part of 
their channel line-ups.17 
The reality is that the number of retransmission disputes is growing.18 This 
trend is likely to continue with increased competition among MVPDs and 
mounting involvement by networks in local affiliate retransmission negotia-
tions. The question is whether there is a need for a total reworking of retrans-
mission consent law, or is the real competitive need for more limited relief, for 
example, on behalf of new entrant MVPDs that arguably lack the ability to 
negotiate favorable carriage agreements with more established over-the-air 
broadcasters. While the FCC’s proposals, if adopted, may have some effect on 
retransmission negotiations, the Commission’s authority is limited by statute 
and any meaningful change will need to be made by Congress.19 
Section II of this article describes the origins of retransmission consent and 
must carry laws and regulations. Section III outlines the retransmission consent 
negotiation requirement of the 1992 Cable Act. Section IV highlights the cur-
rent retransmission consent negotiations environment. Section V describes the 
current consumer anger and reactions of government officials to that anger. 
Section VI describes the FCC’s recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which 
proposes possible changes to the retransmission consent regulations. Finally, 
Section VII analyzes possible changes to the current negotiations environment 
                                                                                                                 
United States). 
 17 Brill & Murchison, supra note 3. 
 18 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2719 (“disputes over retransmission 
consent have become more contentious and more public, and we recently have seen a rise in 
negotiation impasses that have affected millions of consumers”); see also Brill & Murchi-
son, supra note 3 (“[I]n recent years, the demands for greater cash payments have made 
retransmission consent negotiations between broadcast stations and MVPDs increasingly 
contentious.”). 
 19 Bryan N. Tramont, Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its 
Reach Through Unenforceable and Unwieldy “Voluntary” Agreements, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 
49, 51–52 (2000). As Tramont explains: 
The Commission’s ability to exploit its power to achieve policies outside its 
mandate depends on the agency’s ability to escape judicial and, to a lesser de-
gree, congressional review. In theory, a number of forces should constrain the 
FCC’s authority. Most fundamentally, the Act, like other delegations of congres-
sional authority, delineates the scope of the Commission’s authority over the 
communications marketplace. Essential to this statutory scheme is the ability of 
aggrieved parties to obtain judicial review of the FCC’s actions. Through judi-
cial review, the courts limit the Commission’s discretion to act by enforcing leg-
islative limitations and holding the FCC to standards of reasoned decision[-
]making and constitutional norms. Beyond the limits imposed by the Act and the 
courts, Congress impacts the FCC’s authority through appropriations and over-
sight. Theoretically, these constraints require the Commission to stay within its 
regulatory and jurisdictional boundaries and to engage in reasoned and publicly 
documented decision-making procedures. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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given modern market realities. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT RETRANSMISSION 
CONSENT AND MUST-CARRY REGIME 
Cable television originated in the late 1940s as a retransmission service for 
areas that did not receive a high quality signal from broadcast television sta-
tions using standard antennas.20 Cable television did not initially compete with 
broadcasters, but rather expanded the audience broadcast stations were able to 
reach.21 Consequently, in 1958 the FCC declined to regulate cable television, 
stating that cable television was not a common carrier or a broadcaster under 
the Communications Act of 1934.22 The FCC reaffirmed this interpretation in 
1959.23 
As cable operators began adding “distant” signals to their offerings, cable 
television became more valuable to consumers and a potential threat to local 
broadcasters.24 In response to these developments, in 1963, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia upheld a Commission decision refusing to 
grant a microwave license to a cable operator unless the cable operator agreed 
to carry the signal of the local broadcast station.25 These rules were later ex-
tended, requiring cable systems to transmit to their subscribers the signals of 
any station into whose service area they have brought competing signals (must-
carry)26 and prohibiting the import of distant signals into the 100 largest televi-
                                                 
 20 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 627 (1994) (“The earliest cable 
systems were built in the late 1940’s [sic] to bring clear broadcast television signals to re-
mote or mountainous communities.”); see Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission 
Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of 
the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 104–05 (1996); see also Nat’l Cable & Tele-
comms. Ass’n, Who We Are: Our Story, NCTA, available at http://commcns.org/1i0jEDu 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (providing a useful graph, which depicts the history of cable). 
 21 See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 627 (noting that, initially, cable systems’ purpose 
“was not to replace broadcast television but to enhance it”). 
 22 Frontier Broadcast Co. v. J.E. Collier, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 
251, 253–54 (Apr. 2, 1958). 
 23 In re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV 
“Satellite” Stations, and TV “Repeaters” on the Orderly Development of Television Broad-
casting, Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427–28 (Apr. 13, 1959). 
 24 Lubinsky, supra note 20, at 105. 
 25 Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. F.C.C., 321 F.2d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
 26 In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern 
the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay 
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems; and Amendment of Subpart I, Part 21, 
to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic 
Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to Relay Tel-
evision Broadcast Signals to Community Antenna Television Systems, First Report and 
Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 716–19 (Apr. 22, 1965) (applying rules to all cable providers using 
microwave relay systems). In 1966, the requirement was expanded to all cable systems. See 
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sion markets without FCC approval.27 These rules were upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1968.28 In 1972, the FCC added a program exclusivity requirement, 
which gave local television stations that had purchased exclusive exhibition 
rights and copyright holders the ability to demand that the local cable systems 
delete a program from retransmitted distant signals.29 However, in Quincy Ca-
ble TV, Inc., the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC’s must-carry regulations vio-
lated cable operators’ First Amendment rights.30 Subsequently, the FCC at-
tempted to make the rules consistent with the Quincy Cable decision, but the 
D.C. Circuit again struck them down as a violation of the First Amendment.31 
In addition to reviewing FCC regulation, the courts were also addressing 
copyright questions raised by broadcast retransmission over cable systems. In 
response to two Supreme Court decisions, finding that the retransmission of 
broadcast programming did not implicate copyright issues,32 Congress revised 
                                                                                                                 
In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the 
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay 
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems; Amendment of Subpart I, Part 21, to 
Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic Public 
Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to Relay Television 
Broadcast Signals to Community Antenna Television Systems; Amendment of Parts 21, 74, 
and 91 to Adopt Rules and Regulations Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast 
Signals by Community Antenna Television Systems, and Related Matters, Second Report 
and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, 746 (Mar. 4, 1966) [hereinafter CATV Second Report and Or-
der] (“To insure effective integration of CATV with a fully developed television service, the 
new regulations will apply equally to all CATV systems, including those which require 
microwave licenses and those which receive their signals off the air . . . The microwave 
rules will be revised to reflect the new rules adopted for all systems.”). 
 27 CATV Second Report and Order, supra note 26, at 782. 
 28 In United States v. Southwestern Cable, the Court upheld the Commission’s authority 
to prohibit a cable operator’s ability to import the distant signal of a local television stations 
from another local market. United States v. Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 175, 178, 181 (1968). 
It also affirmed the Commission’s ancillary authority to regulate cable operators in aid of its 
authority to regulate television broadcasting. Id. at 178. 
 29 In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations 
Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; and Inquiry into the Development of 
Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking 
and/or Legislative Proposals; Amendment of Section 74.1107 of the Commission’s Rules 
and Regulations to Avoid Filing of Repetitious Requests; Amendment of Section 74.1031(c) 
and 74.1105(a) and (b) of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations As They Relate to Addi-
tion of New Television Signals; Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s 
Rules and Regulations Relative to Federal-State or Local Relationships in the Community 
Antenna Television System Field; and/or Formulation of Legislative Proposals in This Re-
spect; Amendment of Subpart K of Part 74 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations with 
Respect to Technical Standards for Community Antenna Television Systems, Cable Televi-
sion Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 165 (Feb. 3, 1972). 
 30 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 31 Century Commc’ns Corp. v. F.C.C., 835 F.2d 292, 297, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 32 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 412 (1974) (hearing 
a claim by holders of copyrighted television programs, which alleged copyright infringe-
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the Copyright Act to establish a compulsory licensing scheme.33 These changes 
required cable operators to compensate copyright owners for retransmitted 
programming based on a government-set formula, but did not require payment 
to broadcasters for retransmission of local or distant signals.34 After these 
changes to the Copyright Act, the idea of retransmission consent was proposed 
to the FCC by the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion (“NTIA”),35 but no such scheme was adopted. 
The retransmission and must-carry laws in place today were passed as part 
of the 1992 Cable Act.36 Congress sought to address a number of issues, in-
cluding consumer complaints regarding rising cable rates and poor service 
quality.37 The Act re-regulated basic tier cable rates38—which had been deregu-
lated in 198439—and the Act also eliminated exclusive cable franchises40 and 
increased consumer protections.41 In addition, while leaving the copyright 
payment scheme intact, Congress added retransmission consent requirements 
and must-carry provisions.42 The retransmission provision prohibits a cable 
system or other MVPD from retransmitting the signal of a broadcasting station, 
unless it receives the express authority of the originating station or pursuant to 
the must-carry provisions, if a station elects to be subject to them.43 Thus, if a 
                                                                                                                 
ment through the broadcasting of television programs by CATV systems); Fortnightly Corp. 
v. United Artists Television Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395, 402 (1968) (deciding whether CATV 
systems performed the copyrighted works). 
 33 Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–801 (2006)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88–89 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5703 (stating that the compulsory copyright 
was adopted in response to Supreme Court precedent). 
 34 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012) (providing an exemption for retransmissions within the 
station’s local service area). 
 35 Lubinsky, supra note 20, at 112. 
 36 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see 47 
U.S.C. §534 (2006) (requiring must carry); see also 47 U.S.C. § 325 (2006) (retransmission 
consent). 
 37 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 §§ 3, 8, 106 
Stat. 1460, 1464–71, 1484 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 543, 552) (regulating rates and service 
quality). 
 38 Id. § 3, 106 Stat. 1460, 1464 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2)). 
 39 Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable Television Rate Deregulation, 3 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 145, 
145, 150 (1996). 
 40 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 7, 106 Stat. 
1460, 1483 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). 
 41 Id. §§ 8, 19–20, 106 Stat. 1460, 1484, 1494, 1497 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 551–52) 
(regulating service quality and privacy). 
 42 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (2006). If the station elects must carry status pursuant to section 
534, then no retransmission consent fees are owed. See id. § 534. Further, section 535 re-
quires cable operators to carry the signals of qualified, noncommercial educational televi-
sion stations. Id. § 535(a). 
 43 Id. § 325(b)(1). 
2014] RETRANSMISSION CONSENT 115 
broadcaster selects must carry, it is guaranteed carriage on cable systems oper-
ating within its broadcast footprint, but will receive no compensation.44 If a 
broadcaster chooses retransmission consent, it is not guaranteed carriage, but 
can negotiate “in good faith” for compensation.45 Broadcasters were required to 
choose between retransmission consent and must-carry within one year of § 
325’s enactment and every three years thereafter.46 
The Act also required the FCC to establish rules to implement these provi-
sions.47 In 1993, the FCC determined that retransmission consent applies to 
both distant and local signals, but only local broadcasters have the option of 
selecting must carry.48 In addition, the Commission concluded that a broadcast-
er’s failure to choose either must-carry or retransmission consent by the appli-
cable deadline would result in must-carry status for the broadcaster; the broad-
caster would then need to bargain over the rights to the signal, rather than the 
rights in the individual programming.49 However, the FCC’s authority to re-
quire retransmission consent agreements is limited because the only restriction 
on broadcasters is that they negotiate in good faith.50 
The impetus for the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions was 
to protect broadcasters and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the growing pop-
ularity (and power) of cable television.51 The Conference Committee Report for 
the Act does not provide much information regarding the inclusion of the re-
transmission consent and must-carry provisions; however, the provisions 
evolved from a report by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.52 The Senate Committee’s report stated: 
Cable systems now include not only local signals, but also distant broadcast 
                                                 
 44 Rob Frieden, Analog and Digital Must-Carry Obligations of Cable and Satellite Tel-
evision Operators in the United States, 15 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 230, 231, 234 & n.9 (2006). 
 45 Id. at 241 n.31. 
 46 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(B). 
 47 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 6, 106 Stat. 
1460, 1482–1483 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 325(b)(3)). 
 48 In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992, Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 2965, 2972–74 (Mar. 29, 1993); Thomas W. 
Hazlett, Digitizing “Must-Carry” Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2000) (“Must-carry rules require cable systems to carry local broad-
cast signals without charge.”). 
 49 In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992, supra note 48, at 3002. The Commission believed that making “must-carry the 
default category” would incentivize stations to grant the “express authority” needed by cable 
operators to acquire access to the signals for the operators’ subscribers. Id. 
 50 AM. TELEVISION ALLIANCE, UNTIL THE RETRANS RULES CHANGE, THE SKY’S THE LIM-
IT ON BROADCASTER BLACKOUTS, AMERICAN TELEVISION ALLIANCE 6, available at 
http://commcns.org/1jN2hru (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
 51 Former Rep. Jack Fields, Fix Broken Broadcast Retransmission Consent System, 
HILL (Nov. 15, 2010, 11:53 AM), http://commcns.org/1coV0OY. 
 52 Lubinsky, supra note 20, at 119. 
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signals and the programming of cable networks and premium services. . . . Due 
to the FCC’s interpretation of section 325, however, cable systems use these 
signals without having to seek the permission of the originating broadcaster or 
having to compensate the broadcaster for the value its product creates for the 
cable operator.53 
The Report further explained that this created a “distortion in the video mar-
ketplace which threatens the future of over-the-air broadcasting”54 and “the 
intent of [the retransmission consent provision] is to ensure that our system of 
free broadcasting remain [sic] vibrant, and not be replaced by a system which 
requires consumers to pay for television service.”55 The Committee intended 
“to establish a marketplace for the disposition of the rights to retransmit broad-
cast signals” but did not intend “to dictate the outcome of the ensuing market-
place negotiations.”56 
III. RETRANSMISSION NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE 1992 
CABLE ACT 
Although broadcasters tried to use the new Act to seek monetary compensa-
tion in return for retransmission consent, cable operators strongly resisted this 
and instead offered “to compensate broadcasters with advertising time, cross-
promotions, and carriage of affiliated channels.”57 As the FCC noted: 
[By 2005], cash still has not emerged as a principal form of consideration 
for retransmission consent. Today, virtually all retransmission consent agree-
ments involve a cable operator providing in-kind consideration to the broad-
caster.58 
However, despite the fact that broadcasters were generally not able to nego-
tiate cash compensation,59 the FCC still found that: 
Must-carry alone would fail to provide stations with the opportunity to be 
compensated for their popular programming. Retransmission consent alone 
would not preserve local stations that have a smaller audience yet still offer 
free over-the-air programming and serve the public in their local areas.60 
In 2000, the FCC adopted rules governing what constituted “good-faith” ne-
                                                 
 53 S. Rep. No. 102-92, at 35 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168. 
 54 Id., 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1168. 
 55 Id. at 36, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169. 
 56 Id., 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169. 
 57 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND EXCLUSIVITY RULES: RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 208 OF THE SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION 
AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2004, at 6 (2005), available at http://commcns.org/1lvhC35. 
 58 Id. at 6–7. 
 59 Id. at 6. 
 60 Id. at 18. 
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gotiations between cable providers and direct satellite providers61 (together 
“MVPDs”) and broadcasters.62 These rules require that broadcasters negotiate 
with MVPDs in good faith, while making an exception for retransmission con-
sents—proposed or entered into—containing different terms, so long as such 
terms are based “competitive marketplace considerations.”63 Other rules re-
garding the conduct of negotiations were adopted at the same time.64 These 
rules were originally set to terminate in 2006, but have been extended.65 
At the time this report was published, the relative bargaining position of 
broadcasters began to increase vis-à-vis with that of MVPDs. Broadcasters 
were first able to negotiate monetary compensation from MVPDs beginning in 
2005.66 Cable providers, who long had a monopoly position, were now compet-
ing with direct broadcast satellite providers and telephone companies entering 
the video market, and broadcasters were beginning to explore additional outlets 
for their programming using the Internet.67 Because the satellite providers and 
telephone companies were new entrants in the market, their smaller customer 
bases afforded them less market power from which to resist broadcaster de-
mands for monetary compensation. As these competitors to cable increased 
their market share, broadcasters were able to increase pressure on the cable 
                                                 
 61 Note that satellite providers are governed by separate but similar retransmission con-
sent and must-carry requirements. Compare 47 C.F.R. § 76.65 (2012) (regulating television 
broadcast stations and MVPDs), with id. § 76.66 (governing satellite broadcast signal car-
riage). 
 62 In re Implementation of the Satellite Home View Improvement Act of 1999; Re-
transmission Consent Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, First Report and 
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5445, 5446 (Mar. 16, 2000). The good faith requirement was extended 
to all MVPDs in 2004. See generally Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-477, 118 Stat. 3393 (2004). 
 63 47 C.F.R. § 76.65. 
 64 A broadcaster must not: (1) refuse to negotiate retransmission consent with any mul-
tichannel video programming distributor; (2) refuse to designate a representative with au-
thority make binding representations on retransmission consent; (3) refuse to meet and ne-
gotiate retransmission consent at reasonable times and locations; (4) refuse to put forth more 
than a single, unilateral proposal; (5) fail respond to a retransmission consent proposal of an 
MVPD; (6) enter into an agreement which requires a broadcast station to refrain from grant-
ing retransmission consent to any MVPD; and (7) refusing to execute a written retransmis-
sion consent agreement with an MVPD. Id. § 76.65(b)(1). 
 65 In re Implementation of the Satellite Home View Improvement Act of 1999, Re-
transmission Consent Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, supra note 62, at 
5448 (“The Commission’s rules regarding exclusive retransmission consent agreements 
sunset on January 1, 2006.”); 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(f) (extending the rules to February 28, 
2010). 
 66 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2501, 2584 (Mar. 3, 2006). 
 67 Id. at 2511–69 (discussing the marketplace competition for video programming); see 
Katy Bachman, FCC Set to Decide on Program Access Rule: Could Change Lineups on 
Cable, ADWEEK (Aug. 31, 2012), http://commcns.org/1hH8zZd. 
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companies to make similar deals.68 
Broadcasters had a few additional advantages that further strengthened their 
bargaining position. In addition to increased leverage from MVPD competi-
tors, broadcasters had the protection of the network non-duplication rule, 
which allows a television broadcast station that has purchased exclusive rights 
to network programming within a specified area to demand that a local cable 
system’s duplicate carriage of the same program be blacked out.69 A similar 
protection existed with the syndicated program exclusivity rule, but it applies 
to exclusive contracts for syndicated programming, rather than for network 
programming.70 These twin protections gave broadcasters exclusive geographic 
rights in showing programming to their customers, which allowed them to lev-
erage their customer preferences into money exacted from their cable competi-
tors. Finally, despite the increasingly broad array of non-broadcast program-
ming that are available to cable operators, the broadcast television station sig-
nals are still regarded as “must have” programming.71 
The FCC recognized this broadcaster power over these various types of pro-
gramming when reviewing the News Corp. and DIRECTV transaction.72 The 
Commission described local broadcast stations as “without close substitutes”73 
and noted that News Corp. “possesses significant market power in the [Desig-
nated Market Areas] in which it has the ability to negotiate retransmission con-
sent agreements on behalf of local broadcast television stations.”74 
Despite this increased broadcaster power, the FCC had done little to help 
cable operators and other MVPDs protect themselves against payment of high-
er and higher fees in retransmission consent disputes. In general, the FCC has 
filed few complaints filed regarding the good-faith negotiation requirement. 
Therefore, there was little precedent regarding what constitutes “good faith.”75 
Indeed, the FCC has explicitly recognized that even good faith negotiations 
may not result in an agreement.76 
                                                 
 68 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726 n.48, 2738. 
 69 47 C.F.R. § 76.92(a). 
 70 Id. § 76.101. Syndicated programming is broadcast by local broadcast stations that 
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 71 In re General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, 
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 72 Id. at 476–77. 
 73 Id. at 565. 
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 75 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2724. 
 76 In re Mediacom Communications Corporation v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. 
Emergency Retransmission Consent Complaint and Complaint for Enforcement for Failure 
to Negotiate Retransmission Consent Rights in Good Faith, Memorandum Opinion and 
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With critically important, popular programming, multiple MVPDs in each 
market, and the non-duplication and syndicated program exclusivity rules, the 
power of the broadcasters to demand substantial monetary compensation from 
MVPDs has continued to increase. 
IV. CURRENT RETRANSMISSION CONSENT NEGOTIATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
Expirations of retransmission consent agreements are now loud, public af-
fairs punctuated by ad campaigns by the relevant MVPD and broadcast station, 
each blaming the other for any impasse in negotiations and the possibility of a 
blackout, in which the broadcaster will withdraw its programming from the 
MVPD.77 For example, the March 2010 Academy Awards broadcast was 
marred for about 3 million viewers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
because ABC’s New York affiliate required Cablevision, the incumbent cable 
operator, to block out its signal because of a retransmission consent dispute.78 
The signal was restored thirteen minutes into the Awards ceremony.79 During 
the dispute Cablevision said that Disney, the owner of ABC, was putting its 
“own financial interests above their viewers,” while Disney criticized “Ca-
blevision’s legendary greed and disregard for the needs of their customers.”80 
In October 2010, Cablevision viewers endured a two-week blackout of 
Fox’s local affiliate, which prevented Cablevision customers from watching a 
significant part of the Major League Baseball playoffs.81 The parties settled 
their dispute prior to the beginning of the World Series, with Cablevision stat-
ing, “In the absence of any meaningful action from the FCC, Cablevision has 
agreed to pay Fox an unfair price for multiple channels of its programming 
including many in which our customers have little or no interest.”82 A further 
interesting feature of the Cablevision/Fox dispute was that Fox blocked Ca-
blevision’s Internet subscribers from accessing Fox shows on Hulu.com, ex-
                                                                                                                 
Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 35, 45 (Jan. 4, 2007). 
 77 See Roger Yu, CBS, Time Warner Cable Reach Deal, End Blackout: Programming 
Resumed Monday for More Than 3 Million Customers, USA TODAY, Sept. 3, 2013, at A4 
(discussing the Time Warner Cable and CBS dispute). 
 78 Barry Paddock & Richard Huff, ABC-Cablevision Blackout Lifted Just after Oscars 
Begin As Two Companies Reach Agreement, NYDAILYNEWS.COM, 
http://commcns.org/1gNLl1u (last updated Mar. 7, 2010, 10:19 PM). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Sam Schechner & Ethan Smith, Cablevision, Disney End Dispute, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 
8, 2010), http://commcns.org/NOiOjy (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 Tom McElroy, Fox, Cablevision Reach Deal to End NY Blackout, HUFF POST (Oct. 
31, 2010), http://commcns.org/1hH8Paq. 
 82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tending retransmission consent issues to the Internet.83 
In January 2011, Time Warner and Sinclair Broadcast Group came to an 
agreement that prevented the blacking out of certain ABC, Fox, and CBS sta-
tions throughout the country.84 Time Warner was forced to blackout CBS sta-
tions in a number of major markets for a month in August 2013, and included a 
blackout of online CBS video content.85 This last blackout ended as the NFL 
season quickly approached.86 
MVPDs blame broadcasters’ demands for higher retransmission-consent 
fees for the increased cable rates87 levied on consumers and the recurring losses 
of programming for consumers.88 Conversely, broadcasters argue that most 
retransmission consent agreements are resolved without blackouts, that there is 
no evidence showing a relationship between increased retransmission consent 
fees and increased cable rates, and that reducing retransmission consent fees 
would harm both the quality and quantity of broadcast television.89 
Network involvement in retransmission consent is also increasing the likeli-
hood of disputes. The networks have begun pressuring local affiliates for in-
creasing shares of retransmission consent fees.90 Fox has been particularly ag-
gressive, threatening to terminate the network affiliation if a local station does 
not agree to share retransmission fees and even demanding that the local sta-
tion pay the network itself if the local station cannot negotiate sufficient re-
transmission fees.91 Although NBC, CBS, and ABC are also looking for contri-
butions from their local affiliates, they do not appear to be threatening to ter-
                                                 
 83 Cecilia Kang, Fox to Restore Internet Videos to Cablevision Customers, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 16, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://commcns.org/MJBzUD. 
 84 David Goetzl, Fox, Sinclair Extend Carriage Agreement, MEDIADAILYNEWS (Jan. 12, 
2011), http://commcns.org/1pX48hk; see Rob Golum & Sylvia Wier, Sinclair, Time Warner 
Reach Agreement in Fee Dispute, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://commcns.org/1dipDUi. 
 85 Brendan Bordelon, Time Warner Subscribers Ensure CBS Blackout As NFL Season 
Looms, DAILY CALLER (Aug. 21, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fD1LNG. 
 86 Yu, supra note 77, at A4. 
 87 Cable rates have increased at a rate that exceeds inflation, although the price per 
channel increased at a lower rate than inflation. In re Implementation of Section 3 of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Statistical Report on 
Average Rates or Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, Report on 
Cable Industry Prices, 28 F.C.C.R. 9857, 9859 (June 7, 2013). 
 88 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726; see Brill & Murchison, supra note 
3 (describing the increasing frequency of disputes which end in blackouts). 
 89 Letter from Erin L. Dozier, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 3 (May 
6, 2010). The National Association of Broadcasters argues that consumers are twenty times 
more likely to lose television during an electricity outage than during a bargaining impasse 
between broadcasters and MVPDs. Id. 
 90 See Joe Flint, Fox Seeks a Share of Retransmission Fees; the Network Wants Some of 
the Money Affiliates Get from Cable Operators, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at B3. 
 91 Id. 
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minate station affiliations.92 In addition, the Time Warner and Sinclair negotia-
tions, mentioned above, revealed that Time Warner and Fox had entered into 
an agreement which allowed Time Warner to purchase Fox programming if the 
cable operator loses its rights to carry the signals of a Fox affiliate.93 Carrying 
the network feed rather than the affiliate feed deprives the MVPD of local 
news and programming, but allows the MVPD to continue showing the net-
work’s “must-see” offerings.94 This type of side agreement allows the network 
to profit directly from the MVPD but reduces the local affiliates’ leverage vis-
à-vis the MVPD, which in turn decreases any retransmission consent fees that 
can be shared with the network.95 
Blackouts, due to impasses over retransmission consent negotiations, con-
tinue to this day.96 Former Chairman Julius Genachowski has publicly stated 
that it may be time to address these blackouts, but he indicated that Congress 
probably has to act to give the FCC authority to prevent them.97 
V. CONSUMER ANGER AND GOVERNMENT REACTION 
Consumer complaints regarding these high profile blackouts and loss-of-
programming threats have attracted attention from both Congress and the 
FCC.98 Government officials describe consumers as innocent bystanders in-
jured by fights between greedy corporations.99 For example, discussing the Fox 
                                                 
 92 Id. 
 93 Joe Flint, Fights Between Programmers and Distributors Heat Up As 2011 Nears, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2010), http://commcns.org/1c2z6AC. 
 94 Use of this option by an MVPD could implicate the local affiliates’ non-duplication 
rights. However, some broadcasters have not been diligent about protecting these rights, 
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unlikely to conflict with the FCC’s network non-duplication rules. See Joe Flint, Fox Clause 
Is Focal Point of Fight Between Time Warner Cable and Sinclair Broadcast Group, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010), http://commcns.org/1g5rUj6. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See, e.g., Michael Malone, Grant Communications Stations Remain Dark for Dish 
Subs, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Feb. 20, 2013), http://commcns.org/1eNXTYB; Lydia Grimes, 
Lost Channel Sparks Blame Game, ATMORE ADVANCE (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://commcns.org/1g5s1es. 
 97 Genachowski: May Be Time to Update Retrans Rules to Limit Blackouts, MULTI-
CHANNEL NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://commcns.org/1gNLEJu (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
 98 See id.; see also Letter from Senator John Kerry to Chase Carey, President & COO, 
News Corp., and Glenn Britt, Chairman & CEO, Time Warner Cable (Dec. 22, 2009), 
available at http://commcns.org/1diqjJi. 
 99 Television Viewers, Retransmission Consent, and the Public Interest: Hearing Before 
the S. Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence, & Transp., 111th Cong. 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing on Retrans-
mission Consent] (statement of Sen. John F. Kerry) (describing the feelings of consumers 
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and Time Warner dispute, former Senator John Kerry stated that a program-
ming blackout would “neglect[] the core interests of the millions of households 
that subscribe to Time Warner Cable in affected markets.”100 Congressmen and 
public interest groups have strongly condemned Fox’s decision to limit Inter-
net access to its online programming.101 
In October 2010, Senator Kerry introduced legislation that would have re-
stricted broadcasters’ authority to pull their signal during a negotiation impasse 
and that would have also given the FCC increased authority.102 Although hear-
ings were held by the Senate Communications Subcommittee regarding this 
proposed legislation, no further action was taken.103 
A further opportunity for congressional action is in the possible extension of 
the distant signal provisions in the Communications Act’s satellite television 
provisions, where the retransmission consent laws and the good faith negotia-
tion requirements are contained.104 MVPDs have been hard at work lobbying 
members of Congress to modify retransmission consent requirements, and 
broadcasters have been insisting that no changes be made. The Subcommittee 
on Communications and Technology in the House of Representatives has spe-
cifically recognized that the law of retransmission consent may need to be re-
vised in the process of reauthorizing the distant signal provisions.105 It is doubt-
ful that anything significant will change in this Congress concerning retrans-
mission consent given that significant lobbying interests are at polar opposites 
from each other. Nevertheless, the budget and reauthorization process bears 
watching for its potential to include new retransmission consent legislation. 
VI. FCC NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 
During this same timeframe, the FCC has continued to face substantial pres-
sure to take action to prevent, or at least mitigate, future programming black-
outs.106 In March 2010, several MVPDs, both cable and satellite providers, and 
                                                 
 100 Letter from Senator John Kerry to Chase Carey, supra note 98. 
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several public interest groups filed a petition for rulemaking requesting that the 
FCC modify the retransmission consent process to prevent future programming 
blackouts and MVPD rate hikes caused by excessive retransmission consent 
fees paid to broadcasters.107 This petition has generated over 250 comments and 
ex parte notices, according to the FCC’s records.108 In December of that year, 
FCC Media Bureau Chief William Lake stated that the FCC initiated a rule-
making to examine retransmission consent practices in an effort to ensure that 
these fees are set by market forces while also protecting the interests of con-
sumers.109 In describing the effect of programming blackouts on consumers, 
Lake quoted an African proverb that “when the elephants fight, it is the grass 
that suffers.”110 Although the FCC’s authority to regulate retransmission con-
sent is limited, the agency can consider regulations regarding the definition of 
“good faith” negotiations as well as other rules, such as the network non-
duplication requirements, that give broadcasters leverage in negotiations. As 
Lake explained: 
One thing we’ve heard is that uncertainty exists about what good faith      means. Our 
rules provide some limited guidance on this; but, if we can provide greater certainty to 
the marketplace, that could help to guide the negotiating parties and reduce the num-
ber of failed deals and dropped signals. We may try to identify additional practices 
that will be treated as per se violations of the duty to bargain in good faith. We may 
be able to provide more specifics about the meaning and scope of the “totality of the 
circumstances” test. Because a principal concern is to protect consumers when talks 
break down, we may propose to strengthen our notice requirement and extend it to 
non-cable distributors and broadcasters. If some of our broadcast rules are thought to 
interfere with market negotiations, we may want to look at those rules.111 
An indication of what the FCC might want to do (without consideration of 
any statutory authority limitations) can be found in the conditions attached to 
the merger of Comcast and NBC.112 The FCC frequently uses merger applica-
tions to obtain “voluntary” agreements from parties to ensure that they comply 
with certain requirements for which the FCC lacks the statutory authority to 
regulate.113 One of the conditions attached to the Comcast-NBC transaction 
required that NBC affiliates owned by the combined Comcast/NBC entity 
submit to a baseball-style arbitration process during which time Comcast and 
NBC must continue to provide the programming at issue in the event of a dis-
                                                 
 107 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2725. 
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pute regarding the provision of programming.114 In addition, Comcast agreed to 
honor NBC’s agreements to preserve network non-duplication to prevent im-
portation of another affiliate’s broadcast station signal into an NBC affiliate’s 
market.115 Comcast further agreed to refrain from using an NBC network direct 
feed in any NBC affiliate’s market when an NBC affiliate withdraws retrans-
mission consent in connection with retransmission negotiations between Com-
cast/NBC and the NBC affiliate.116 Comcast also agreed not to seek repeal of 
the current retransmission consent regime.117 
However, the FCC recognizes that its ability to reform the retransmission 
consent process without Congressional action is limited.118 On March 3, 2011, 
the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with a goal “to protect 
consumers from the disruptive impact of the loss of broadcast programming 
carried on MVPD video services.”119 In this Notice, the Commission stated that 
it does not believe that it has the authority to require interim carriage or man-
datory binding dispute resolution procedures.120 Nevertheless, it asked for 
comment on certain measures to reduce retransmission consent disputes, in-
cluding: 
[W]hether it should be a per se violation for a station to agree to give a network with 
which it is affiliated the right to approve a retransmission consent agreement with an 
MVPD or to comply with such an approval provision . . . we seek comment on wheth-
er it should be a per se violation for a station to grant another station or station group 
the right to negotiate or the power to approve its retransmission consent agreement 
when the stations are not commonly owned . . . whether it should be a per se violation 
for a [broadcaster or MVPD] to refuse to put forth bona fide proposals on important 
issues . . . whether it should be a per se violation for a [broadcaster or MVPD] to re-
fuse to agree to non-binding mediation when the parties reach an impasse within 30 
days of the expiration of their retransmission consent agreement . . . what it means to 
“unreasonably” delay retransmission consent negotiations [to give more substance to 
the reasonableness requirement in Section 76.65(b)(1)(iii)] . . . whether a broadcast-
er’s request or requirement, as a condition of retransmission consent, that an MVPD 
not carry an out-of-market “significantly viewed” . . . station violates Section 
76.65(b)(1)(vi) of [the Commission’s] rules.121 
Another measure the FCC considered was whether the Commission should 
provide more specificity in defining what would be a breach of good faith un-
der the “totality of the circumstances” in § 76.65(b)(2) and, if so, how.122 An 
additional measure the FCC contemplated was whether it should revise its 
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rules requiring notice to consumers of programming blackouts.123 The FCC also 
asked whether it should eliminate the network non-duplication and syndicated 
exclusivity rules.124 
Although these proposals would put some additional pressure on MVPDs 
and broadcasters to come to agreements on retransmission consent, they are 
unlikely to have a substantial effect because the Commission would not have 
the authority to require binding arbitration or even interim carriage in the event 
of an impasse.125 Eliminating the network non-duplication and syndicated ex-
clusivity rules might sound as if it would give MVPDs greater leverage to bar-
gain among broadcasters, but as the FCC recognized, these rules were original-
ly derived from private contracts between broadcast networks and their affili-
ates.126 Thus, even if the FCC were to remove them, the parties could enforce 
such agreements through litigation.127 
Since the record was complete with respect to this NPRM, the Commission 
itself has taken no formal steps to complete work in the docket.128 Nevertheless, 
the industry continues to pressure the FCC.129 The latest arguments surround 
the allegation that unaffiliated broadcasting entities are jointly engaged in re-
transmission consent negotiations, increasing the number of potential broadcast 
stations subject to the negotiations and hence their market power.130 MVPDs 
argue that such joint groupings should be outlawed because they unnecessarily 
increase retransmission consent fees and, thus, harm consumers.131 These ar-
guments are made unabashedly, even by multi-billion dollar MVPDs.132 Broad-
casters, of course, claim that these negotiations are lawful, are pro-competitive, 
and that there is no evidence that joint negotiations increase retransmission 
consent fees.133 There is no doubt that the level of the rhetoric is soaring, alt-
hough the public interest arguments for or against a particular proposal are not 
improving. 
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VII. RETRANSMISSION CONSENT IN A CHANGING 
ENVIRONMENT 
One can question whether multi-billion dollar cable TV companies actually 
need any help in their negotiations with over-the-air broadcast stations, particu-
larly those that have much lower capitalization than their larger competitors. 
However, several newer competitors, such as those companies providing Inter-
net-protocol Television (“IPTV”), argue that they are new entrants in local 
markets trying to compete against their much more established cable TV com-
petitors.134 These new entrants argue that they often lack negotiating power 
with over-the-air broadcasters, because they do not yet have sufficient viewers 
to motivate broadcasters to negotiate a reasonable price for carriage of their 
broadcast programming.135 Given that increasing competition in the delivery of 
video programming has long been a goal of both Congress136 and the FCC,137 
the availability of programming, particularly “must see” programming that 
arguably includes local TV broadcasts, might be a goal that policymakers 
would like to advance. Given this market imbalance, it probably would be wise 
to analyze separately the need for retransmission consent rules by these new 
entrants from the interests of more established MVPDs, which may simply be 
looking for legal leverage to help them gain lower programming prices. This is 
help that they do not need.138 
Without congressional modification of the laws governing retransmission 
consent, it is likely that the current brinkmanship between broadcasters and 
MVPDs will continue regardless of whether the FCC adopts its proposed 
changes. Broadcast networks and MVPDs, who are, more and more frequently, 
direct competitors in originating programming, are under increasing pressure 
to enhance revenues. Networks are also putting pressure on their affiliates for 
additional revenue and even percentages of retransmission consent fees.139 The 
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cost of programming, especially in the sports market, continues to rise.140 Con-
sumers are able to get more programming for free on the Internet.141 These and 
other factors will push broadcast affiliates and networks to demand greater 
compensation from MVPDs, while impelling MVPDs, who face consumer 
anger over rate increases, to resist. But all of these factors applicable to estab-
lished market players militate against further congressional or regulatory ac-
tion, which might well end up simply being government action that tips the 
scales of the negotiations toward one type of player or the other. This type of 
regulatory intervention is unwarranted either as a matter of antitrust principles, 
or to promote competition in the programming environment. 
Thus, Congress would be better off taking a step back and determining 
whether the current legal structure makes sense given the vast changes that 
have occurred in the video-programming market.142 In 1993, one year after the 
1992 Cable Act was adopted, 40 percent of television households relied on 
over-the-air television.143 By 2009, only 10 percent of households were still 
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MCCLATCHDC (Sept. 16, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fD2BKg (“[T]he number of house-
holds that choose [to cut the cord] is on the rise, from 2 million in 2007 to 5 million in 2013, 
Nielsen’s data show.”). 
 142 Consumers want to be connected, and online video increasingly provides this connec-
tion. See Williams, supra note 141 (“The trend, analysts say, is being fueled by the populari-
ty of online video . . . [in what the industry calls] ‘over the top’ viewing.”); Dan O’Shea, 
SNL Kagan: Q3 Video Subscriber Net Loss Hits 119,000, CONNECTED PLANET ONLINE 
(Nov. 18, 2010, 12:14 PM), http://commcns.org/1ksGsAr (“[R]apidly growing loss[es] . . . 
[show that] the impact of over-the[-]top video can no longer be dismissed.”). In fact, recent 
research indicates that average online viewing time is now nearly equal to traditional televi-
sion viewing time. Maria Sciullo, I Want My E(verywhere)-TV!, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 
11, 2013), http://commcns.org/1hHaGfn (“A recent report from eMarketer . . . concluded 
that for the first time, U.S. adults are on the verge of spending more time using digital media 
than watching traditional television on a set.”). 
 143 See In re Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
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ket for the Delivery of Video Programming, First Report, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 7451–52 (Sept. 
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doing so.144 Similarly, in 1993, almost all multichannel video subscribers were 
cable customers.145 By the end of 2010, cable had a little over 60 percent of the 
multichannel video market, with satellite providers at around 33 percent and 
telecommunications companies at about 6.4 percent.146 
Other market developments also point to the need for a complete reexamina-
tion of cable and broadcast regulation. Cable channels and broadcasters are 
now direct competitors in programming.147 Cable networks produce their own 
original programming, although not to nearly the same degree as the net-
works,148 and are starting to challenge network dominance.149 Cable providers 
can rely on two revenue streams, subscriber fees and advertising, while broad-
casters are dependent on advertising and to a lesser extent on retransmission 
consent fees.150 Broadcast television is watched by almost 90 percent of con-
sumers via an MVPD subscription in the same way as cable channels; howev-
er, broadcasters have substantially higher regulatory burdens, such restrictions 
on indecency and requirements for children’s programming.151 In addition, the 
availability of content over the Internet and on demand continues to increase. 
Wireless providers are openly calling for the repurposing of television broad-
cast spectrum to meet the growing demand for wireless broadband services.152 
Further, broadcasters face a new threat: Internet services that allow people to 
watch broadcast television on their computers.153 
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2014] RETRANSMISSION CONSENT 129 
Over-the-air TV broadcasters themselves enjoy several regulatory ad-
vantages that seem anachronistic in today’s marketplace. Examples such as 
syndicated exclusivity and network non-duplication rights are just two exam-
ples of these advantages.154 These unique advantages were created in order to 
protect broadcasters from unfair cable TV competition, but they are no longer 
necessary in today’s marketplace.155 Eliminating these special advantages on all 
sides may level the playing field, create a more competitive retransmission 
consent negotiation environment, and preclude further government regula-
tion.156 
This all points to more limited retransmission consent modifications aimed 
solely at aiding new entrants in obtaining needed broadcast programming dur-
ing the early stages of their entry into particular viewer markets. A regulation 
that would guarantee access for a start-up period, such as for two years, would 
go far in ending delay tactics that over-the-air broadcasters exhibited toward 
new entrants. 
Although regulators focus on viewing audience disruptions caused by re-
transmission consent-related blackouts, where there exists market competition 
for programming, these types of disruptions will work themselves out fairly 
quickly. Despite individual subscribers’ understandable anger that they cannot 
view their favorite football game or the Academy Awards, these types of dis-
ruptions simply are not so serious that they warrant government intervention. 
Consumers are increasingly capable of voting with their pocketbooks. If indi-
vidual corporate actors anger enough consumers, they are not going to be in 
business long, and these consumers will find their programming other ways, 
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which often cuts the offending business out of the equation.157 
Rather than considering the relative merits of MVPD arguments that broad-
casters are price gouging and broadcaster arguments that they are only seeking 
appropriate compensation for their programming, it is time to rethink the laws 
and regulations governing cable and broadcast as a whole. The proposed revi-
sions to retransmission consent rules will mitigate consumer blackouts in the 
short term, but do nothing to address the fundamental changes in the video dis-
tribution industry. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The twin broadcast programming provisions of must carry and retransmis-
sion consent have served the purpose of ensuring that MVPDs are allowed to 
carry local broadcast programming, while protecting broadcasters from unfair 
competition. Over time, however, these provisions have failed to keep pace 
with market realities. Broadcasters began to exact higher and higher payments 
in exchange for permission to carry their local stations on MVPD systems. 
Breakdown of negotiation over broadcast programming have often disrupted 
consumers by creating blackouts at unpredictable periods of time. 
Although the Commission is examining in an NPRM whether to change re-
transmission consent regulations, it is unclear whether it has the statutory au-
thority to enact meaningful changes to retransmission consent law. Given the 
rise in competition, however, it is unclear that any further regulation is justi-
fied, except perhaps to protect nascent MVPD competitors. In the meantime, 
however, continued retransmission consent battles are likely to continue. More 
fundamental video marketplace reform seems justified, and would likely ad-
dress some of the negotiations imbalances that are the source of the retransmis-
sion consent battles. 
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